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Abstract
Inattention is a symptom of many clinical disorders including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and is thought 
to be primarily related to limitations in working memory. In two studies, we investigated the implications of inattention for 
task switching performance. In study one, we measured task switching performance using predictable and unpredictable 
conditions in adults who self-rated inattention and other ADHD-related tendencies. Tasks required proactive control and 
reactive control, respectively, under both high and low working memory loads. Results revealed that inattentive, but not 
hyperactive/impulsive traits, predicted switch costs when switching was predictable and working memory load was high. 
None of the ADHD traits were related to unpredictable switch costs. Study two was designed to: (1) de-confound the role of 
proactive control and the need to keep track of task order in the predictable task switching paradigm; (2) investigate whether 
goal neglect, an impairment related to working memory, could explain the relationship between inattention and predictable 
task switching. Results revealed that neither predictability nor the need to keep track of the task order led to the association 
between switch costs and inattention, but instead it was the tendency for those high in inattention to neglect preparatory 
proactive control, especially when reactive control options were available.
Introduction
Inattention is a symptom of many clinical and mental disor-
ders although it is most closely associated with attention def-
icit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). ADHD manifests itself 
in three presentations: predominantly inattentive (ADHD-
I), predominantly hyperactive/impulsive (ADHD-HI) and 
combined (ADHD-C: American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). Our present focus is on the symptom of inattention 
as characterised as a difficulty in sustaining attention, lis-
tening/following conversations/instructions, and organis-
ing. Furthermore, it is associated with mind wandering-like 
experiences (e.g. “mind seems elsewhere” or “distractible by 
unrelated thoughts”), forgetfulness and hesitation to engage 
in activities requiring sustained mental effort (APA, 2013).
Whilst ADHD is a widely diagnosed neurodevelopmen-
tal disorder with prevalence rates of 5–10% in childhood 
and 4.4% in adulthood (Kessler et al. 2005), research has 
suggested that inattention, like the other ADHD symptoms, 
is best thought of as being on a continuum as opposed to 
being categorically different from sub-clinical levels of the 
disorder (Barkley & Murphy, 1998). Based on this view, 
tendencies of inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity are 
also experienced by sub-clinical populations, and, those with 
a clinical diagnosis represent the extreme end of the spec-
trum. Measuring ADHD-related experiences on a continu-
ous scale has been supported by taxometric studies (Haslam 
et al. 2006; Salum et al. 2014) and studies report a signifi-
cant impact of ADHD-related traits at sub-clinical levels 
(Elisa, Balaguer-Ballester, & Parris, 2016; Overbey, Snell, 
& Callis, 2011; Seli, Smallwood, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2015).
Diamond (2005) argued, and research has supported, 
that inattention is primarily related to limitations in work-
ing memory (Nigg, 2006; Barkley, 1994; Nigg, 2001). For 
example, Martinussen et al. (2005) revealed that inattentive 
(but not hyperactive/impulsive) symptoms were related to 
verbal and visuospatial working memory (WM) impairments 
in clinical samples (see also Klingberg et al., 2005). Using 
non-clinical samples, Gathercole et al. (2008) revealed that 
low WM capacity children had more inattentive traits than 
a high WM group. Lui and Tannock (2007) also reported 
that poor performance on WM tasks predicted parent-rated 
inattentive traits at sub-clinical levels. In adults, Elisa et al. 
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(2016) found that self-reported inattentive traits predicted 
the performance on verbal WM at sub-clinical levels. Thus, 
the literature provides evidence for a link between inattentive 
symptoms and WM performance at clinical and sub-clinical 
levels.
Although the core executive functions of WM, response 
inhibition and task switching are thought to be independ-
ent processes research also suggests that they may still be 
interrelated (Friedman & Miyake, 2017). Therefore, WM 
limitations in inattentive individuals might produce impaired 
performance on other executive function tasks, such as task 
switching (e.g. Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Liefooghe, Van-
dierendonck, Muyllaert, Verbruggen, & Vanneste, 2005; 
Miyake, Emerson, Padilla, & Ahn, 2004). Moreover, since 
the relationship between inattention and task switching per-
formance has not yet been investigated it is possible that 
inattention also leads to impaired task switching perfor-
mance irrespective of WM involvement.
Task switching paradigms (TSPs) measure the cognitive 
flexibility required to achieve task goals when the environ-
ment is constantly changing. Switching refers to an indi-
vidual’s ability to self-adjust their performance based on 
the current requirements to achieve task goals. To perform 
a switch, attentional resources must shift to the relevant task 
set (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Jersild, 1927; Rogers 
& Monsell, 1995; Spector & Biederman, 1976). Task-set 
refers to the parameters required to perform a particular 
task such as stimulus identification, response selection and 
response execution (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Vandieren-
donck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010).
In TSPs, participants are often asked to perform two 
tasks in quick succession. A participant might be required 
to repeat the same task (e.g. judging whether a number is 
higher or lower than 5) a number of times before they are 
asked to perform another task (e.g. judging whether a pre-
sented number is odd or even). These two tasks would be 
presented such that there are a number of repeat and switch 
trials in each experiment. Switching from one task to another 
is associated with longer reaction times (RTs) and higher 
error rates compared to repeat trials. These performance 
costs are referred to as switch costs (Meiran, Chorev, & 
Sapir, 2000; Altmann, 2004; Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 
2002; Koch, 2001; Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). 
Various accounts have been made to explain the source of 
switch costs including the role of interference from the pre-
vious task-set (Allport et al., 1994) and task-set reconfigura-
tion (Rogers & Monsell, 1995).
It has been argued that task switching performance calls 
upon WM processing for the activation and maintenance 
of task-sets (Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Liefooghe et al., 
2005; Miyake et al., 2004) and for tracking sequential action 
plans (Bryck & Mayr, 2008). However, research has failed 
to find an effect of WM on task switching (Kane, Conway, 
Hambrick, & Engle, 2007; Logan, 2004 but see Liefooghe, 
Barrouillet, Vandierendonck, & Camos, 2008). Nevertheless, 
the reliance of task switching on WM might depend on the 
parameters of the task switching requirements. For exam-
ple, WM would be required to prepare for the upcoming 
task when the information about the upcoming task is avail-
able in advance as in predictable TSPs. The reconfiguration 
account of task switching suggests that switching requires 
a mental form of ‘gear changing’ (task-set reconfiguration) 
to trigger the task-specific processes, such as retrieving the 
relevant task-set. If advanced knowledge and sufficient time 
is allowed, individuals are able to prepare for the upcoming 
task, thereby reducing the switch cost (reconfiguration view; 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This has been referred to as pro-
active control (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007).
The distinction between proactive and reactive control 
was first introduced by Braver et al. (2007) who proposed 
the dual-mechanism theory of cognitive control, suggesting 
two types of control for the flexible, goal-related behaviour. 
Proactive control refers to the active maintenance of infor-
mation (e.g. general task instructions, relevant information 
from the previous stimuli or salient cues) that is beneficial 
for responding to upcoming stimuli (Engle & Kane, 2003; 
Kane et al., 2007), and, the ability to make use of the pre-
vious stimuli to predict the upcoming event (Braver et al., 
2007). Reactive control involves retrieving contextual infor-
mation that is relevant for current decision making. Pro-
active control requires maintaining previous knowledge 
and using this to respond efficiently when a future event is 
consistent with expectations. In an attempt to integrate the 
role of preparation and interference during switching, Van-
dierendonck et al. (2010) evaluated the switch costs in two 
processing stages: preparation and stimulus-based process-
ing. They suggested that two forms of control are needed: 
reactive control to overcome the interference due to task-set 
inertia and proactive control to shield the task relevant goal 
and instructions. Research has found that high WM capac-
ity participants are better at making use of prior informa-
tion or cue information to predict the upcoming event in 
various tasks. High WM capacity participants are also more 
able to maintain the goal relevant information in memory 
(Engle & Kane, 2003; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004; 
Redick, Calvo, Gay, & Engle, 2011) and use this information 
proactively to bias their responses (Redick et al., 2011). In 
individuals reporting high levels of inattention one would, 
therefore, be expected to exhibit poorer use of cue informa-
tion and poorer maintenance of goal relevant information. 
In sum, during predictable task switching, a form of proac-
tive control is needed to perform advanced reconfiguration 
to prepare for the upcoming stimuli and shield the relevant 
goal, and this is related to WM capacity. When the use of 
proactive control is not possible (i.e. future events cannot 
be reliably predicted), individuals rely on reactive control 
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(Redick, 2014). Furthermore, reactive control would be used 
to overcome task set inertia.
Task switching and ADHD
Whilst there has been no research, to our knowledge, con-
sidering task switching performance and inattention, stud-
ies using TSPs on participants with ADHD have revealed 
conflicting results. Using the same task, Cepeda et al. (2000) 
and Kramer et al. (2001) reported larger switch costs in those 
with ADHD compared to controls while Oades and Chris-
tiansen (2008) failed to find a significant difference in switch 
costs. Other studies reported significantly larger switch 
costs for ADHD participants (King, Colla, Brass, Heuser, 
& von Cramon, 2007) while others did not (Rauch, Gold, 
& Schmitt, 2012). For example, Wu et al. (2006) investi-
gated the switching performance for those with and without 
ADHD under WM load. Participants were asked to switch 
between colour naming and word reading in a predictable 
manner in two conditions: cue-absent and cue-present. In 
the cue-present condition, the stimuli were presented with a 
circle divided into four equal segments, and, the stimuli were 
presented in one of the possible segments in clockwise order. 
The task was cued in a way that participants could work 
out the required task based on the position of the stimulus. 
In cue-absent conditions, the circle disappeared, forcing 
participants to keep track of the task order (to increase the 
WM load). Wu et al. (2006) failed to find a group difference 
between cue-absent and cue-present conditions for ADHD 
participants, suggesting no relationship between task switch-
ing and ADHD and that the WM load did not affect those 
with ADHD any more than control participants.
There may be several reasons for the inconsistent find-
ings. First and most important, the inconsistent results could 
be the unexplored differences in cognitive performance 
between ADHD-I and ADHD-C/ADHD-HI and the extent 
to which the TSP relied on WM. If the TSP has a high WM 
load component you would expect those with ADHD-I or 
self-reported inattention to exhibit greater problems with 
task switching.
Another possible explanation for larger switch costs for 
ADHD participants when they have been observed, and one 
that we also explore here in self-reporting adults, and is 
potentially unrelated to WM capacity, is that the costs were 
observed under interference load (incongruent stimuli). For 
example, Cepeda et al. (2000) reported much larger switch 
costs to incongruent than congruent stimuli for ADHD par-
ticipants, suggesting that the overall increase in switch costs 
could be due to the slowed responses on incongruent trials 
only. The interference view of task switching (Allport et al., 
1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie & Allport, 2000) sug-
gests that the switch costs (larger RTs to switch than repeat 
trials) are observed because the persistent activation of the 
previously activated task-set interferes with the current acti-
vation of the new task-set, creating proactive interference. 
When sufficient time is allowed (long response-stimulus 
intervals), the activation of the previous task-set decays 
(task-set inertia), allowing participants to switch more effi-
ciently due to the minimum amount of interference (Allport 
et al., 1994).
The interference account also suggests that part of the 
switch cost derives from interference triggered by the stimu-
lus itself (task rule congruency). TSPs may involve unique 
stimuli for each task (univalent stimuli) or both (or more) 
tasks could be associated with the same stimulus set (biva-
lent stimuli). Smaller switch costs in univalent (unique stim-
uli for each task) compared to bivalent (two or more tasks 
associated with the same stimulus set) stimuli have been 
reported, suggesting that switching is more efficient when 
the stimulus indicates only one type of task-set (Allport 
et al., 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Spector and Bieder-
man, 1976). In sum, it is possible that task-set inertia and/or 
task rule congruency would play a role in the link between 
switch costs and ADHD symptoms.
In summary, the literature on ADHD and task switch-
ing is inconsistent. We argue that the inconsistent findings 
could be due to a failure to consider each presentation of 
ADHD (inattention and hyperactive/impulsive) and/or the 
type of TSP employed. Given the relationship between WM 
and inattention, it is likely that inattention will affect task 
switching performance when there is a WM load. Consid-
ering the need for WM to perform preparatory proactive 
control during task switching, it is reasonable to think that 
inattentive traits may be related to infrequent engagement 
of proactive control to prepare for upcoming stimuli due to 
associated WM limitations (e.g. Elisa et al., 2016; Martinus-
sen et al., 2005). However, where larger switch costs have 
been reported in those with ADHD, it has been argued that 
it is a failure to inhibit interference, and not a WM issue, that 
causes the impaired performance.
Study 1
In the present study we measured the trait of inattention in 
undiagnosed adults (along with hyperactivity and impul-
sivity traits) and its relationship to predictability, interfer-
ence and WM load during task switching performance. 
Each participant performed two TSPs: (1) a predictable 
TSP where participants have to maintain the task order and 
use this information to prepare in advance for an upcoming 
repeat or switch trial. In the cue-present condition (low 
WM load condition), a cue was provided to indicate task 
order. In the cue-absent condition no additional informa-
tion was provided and participants had to maintain task 
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order in WM (high WM load condition). The cue-present 
condition allowed the use of reactive and proactive con-
trol, while the cue-absent condition forced participants to 
rely on proactive control only; (2) an unpredictable TSP 
where stimuli appeared in an unpredictable manner (forc-
ing the use of reactive control) in long and short RSIs. 
Long intervals are used to measure the effect of inhibition 
(task-set inertia) in switch cost.
Given the limitations with WM capacity in inattention at 
subclinical (Elisa et al., 2016) and clinical levels (Diamond, 
2005), one would predict an impairment in maintaining task 
order and proactively preparing for the next task, resulting 
in larger switch costs in predictable TSPs, especially when 
there is no environmental support (the cue-absent condition). 
In contrast, if inattention was related to a task switching 
impairment more generally, inattentive traits should predict 
performance on all TSPs. If instead, an observed switch cost 
disadvantage was due to a problem with inhibition, there 
should be an association between one of the core ADHD 
symptoms in the unpredictable switch cost when the RSI is 
short. This is because a long RSI confers extra time between 
the trials to reduce the interference from the previous task-
set (Allport et al., 1994).
Method
Participants
Participants aged between 18 and 35 with normal or cor-
rected vision from non-clinical samples were recruited 
through Bournemouth University’s research participa-
tion system and through advertisements. Participants were 
mainly undergraduate and postgraduate students. Undergrad-
uate students received course credits for their involvement. 
We collected data from 116 individuals (mean age 20.37, SD 
2.87). Initially, sample size was defined by previous research 
measuring ADHD tendencies on a continuum showing rea-
sonable effect sizes (Elisa et al., 2016).
Materials
Connors’ adult ADHD rating scale: short version (CAARS‑S:S)
ADHD tendencies were assessed using CAARS-S:S (Con-
ners, Erhardt, & Sparrow, 1999). The questionnaire requires 
participants to rate the frequency of the 26 items (symptoms) 
using a four-point rating scale. Raw scores for inattention, 
hyperactivity and impulsivity symptoms are transformed 
into t scores to make a comparison across participants. T 
scores range between 28 (lowest) to 90 (highest) calculated 
based on the age and gender.
Predictable task switching paradigm
The task involved the alternative run paradigm (Rogers and 
Monsell, 1995) and was adapted from Wu et al. (2006). Par-
ticipants were presented with digits (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 
9) and asked to decide whether the digit was even/odd (task 
A) or lower/higher than 5 (task B). The task required par-
ticipants to press x if the digit was even or lower than five; 
and press n if the digit was odd or higher than 5. Response 
mapping was counterbalanced across participants. Digits 
requiring the same response for both tasks are referred to 
as being congruent (2, 4, 7, 9). For example, 2 requires the 
same response (e.g. x) for both tasks since it is even and 
lower than 5. Stimuli requiring different key responses for 
each task were referred to as incongruent (6, 8, 1, 3). For 
example, 6 requires x response for even/odd task while the 
correct response would be n for lower/higher task. Stimuli 
were presented in Courier New (bold) 36 points until an 
appropriate key response or maximum duration of 5000 ms 
and followed by 150 ms inter stimulus interval.
The task consisted of three blocks: single task block, low 
load block and high load block. Single task blocks were 
always presented first to allow participants to establish 
stimulus–response mappings. In single task blocks, only 
task A or B was presented consistently within the block. 
The order of the tasks was randomised across participants. 
In the low load block, stimuli were presented in a 10 cm 
by 10 cm square divided into four 5 cm by 5 cm squares 
(Fig. 1). Stimulus presentation order was always clockwise 
and as follows: AABB.
The position of the stimulus indicated the task that needed 
to be performed. The top half of the square indicated the 
even/odd task while the bottom half indicated lower/higher 
task. Therefore, task order was always explicitly cued. Par-
ticipants were also informed about the task order (e.g. even/
odd, even/odd, lower/higher, lower/higher) and were told 
to “switch task every second trial”. The location indicat-
ing each task was counterbalanced across participants (e.g. 
even/odd task was required if the digit was in the top half of 
the square, and in the bottom half for the other half of the 
participants). After a response, instead of a blank screen, the 
square with no stimuli was presented for 150 ms followed 
by either the reminder screen (for incorrect responses or 
Fig. 1  Stimulus cuing frame and instructions for the low load block 
in Study 1
Psychological Research 
1 3
time-outs) or the next stimulus screen (if the response is 
correct). There were total of 160 trials with 12 practice trials 
for the low load block. There were equal numbers of congru-
ent and incongruent trials in each task type (even/odd and 
lower/higher than 5).
Stimulus–response mapping was counterbalanced across 
participants with the restriction that even and low; and odd 
and high was always assigned to the same keys. There were 
an equal number of participants in each stimulus–response 
mapping condition for the task type position (top/bottom).
The high load block followed the same instructions with 
the absence of a square frame. Participants were informed 
about the task sequence (AABB) and expected to keep track 
of the sequence. In this block, a reminder provided informa-
tion about (1) the task instructions (2) the task types for the 
next two trials. The reason for informing participants about 
the next two trials was to prevent participants from losing 
track of the task and to prevent an error leading to a series 
of errors.
Unpredictable task switching paradigm
The stimuli consisted of eight letters (four vowels: A, E, I, U 
and four consonants: G, M, L, K) and eight digits (four even: 
2, 4, 6, 8 and four odd: 3, 5, 7, 9) presented in uppercase 
48-point size in Times New Roman (bold). The same two 
response keys were used for both task sets. That is, partici-
pants were to press the c key if the stimulus was a vowel or if 
it was even; and to press the m key if the letter was a conso-
nant or if the digit was odd. Target responses for vowel/even 
and consonant/odd stimuli were counterbalanced between 
participants. A cue was presented for short (50 ms) and long 
(650 ms) durations immediately before the stimulus (until 
response or maximum 5000 ms). A reminder of instructions 
(2000 ms) followed the stimulus screen in the case of incor-
rect response or time-out.
Single task blocks were always undertaken before the 
mixed block allowing participants to establish stimu-
lus–response mappings before performing the mixed block. 
In the single task block participants were always presented 
with the same type of stimulus (either a letter or a digit). 
Each task had 64 trials (32 long CSI, 32 short CSI) with 16 
practice trials (8 long CSI, 8 short CSI). Only one type of 
task (A or B) was presented for each block and then the other 
task was presented.
In the mixed block, digits and letters were presented in a 
pseudo-random order such that it was not possible to predict 
the next trial. Mixed blocks consisted of six sequences and 
reverse versions of each sequence. Therefore, task A and 
B was counterbalanced within participants. Each sequence 
involved 17 stimuli. After the first trial there were 8 repeti-
tion trials, 4 switch trials and 4 negative priming trials (8 
switch trials in total). We controlled the number of negative 
priming trials because Mayr and Keele (2000) suggested 
that the reactivation of the recently inhibited task-set is 
more difficult than if the task set is inhibited a longer time 
ago. This was because the after effect of inhibition would 
decay over the time, leading to negative priming in the for-
mer but not the latter. Using a TSP with three tasks (i.e. A, 
B, C), they found impaired performance in n-2 repetition 
(e.g. ABA) compared to n-2 switch (e.g. CBA) trials (see 
also Arbuthnott and Frank, 2000; Arbuthnott and Wood-
ward, 2002; Arbuthnott, 2005; Hübner, Dreisbach, Haider, 
& Kluwe, 2003; Koch, Philipp, & Gade, 2006; Schuch and 
Koch, 2003; Sdoia and Ferlazzo, 2008 for consistent find-
ings). In switch trials, two trials required a switch after two 
repetitions of the alternative task and two trials occurred 
after three repetitions of the alternative task. We controlled 
the number of switch and negative priming trials as they 
require different levels of inhibition (e.g. Arbuthnott, 2005; 
Koch et al., 2006; Sdoia and Ferlazzo, 2008). Each sequence 
was pseudo-randomised with the limitations of: (1) the 
first trial was always followed by a repeat trial (2) negative 
priming trials were always presented after a repeat trial or 
another negative priming trial (3) switch trials were always 
presented after two or three repeat trials. There were total 
of 16 sequences (17 trials each) each for short and long RSI 
conditions. The first two sequences (1 long, 1 short) of the 
mixed block were practice trials. Before each sequence, par-
ticipants were informed whether the cue duration would be 
long or short. After each sequence an information screen 
was shown indicating that the sequence was completed, and 
participants had to press space key to proceed, thereby hav-
ing an interval in between each sequence. Total task duration 
was approximately 20 min.
Procedure
The present study included: the CAARS-S:S for measur-
ing traits of ADHD, a predictable TSP and an unpredictable 
TSP. Tasks were administered in a pseudo-random order 
with the condition that unpredictable TSP was always pre-
sented before the predictable TSP. Since unpredictable TSP 
required an extra instruction (lower/higher than 5), in order 
to prevent the confusion, it was always administered first. All 
versions of unpredictable TSP (S-R mapping) and predict-
able TSP (even/odd first, low/high first; and S-R mapping) 
were counterbalanced across participants.
Results
Sample
Scores from CAARS revealed that 23 participants scored 
above average on the ADHD index (M = 51.24, SD 8.46). 
For individual symptoms, the number of participants that 
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scored above the average was 35 for inattention (M = 55.78, 
SD 9.34), 26 for hyperactivity (M = 49.65, SD 8.21) and 13 
for impulsivity (M = 48.02, SD 7.86). The number of partici-
pants scoring in each category provided by the CAARS-S:S 
guidelines are reported in Fig. 2. Raw scores are transformed 
into standardised T-scores so that all sub-scales have mean 
of 50 and standard deviation of 10. T scores range between 
28 (lowest) and 90 (highest) calculated based on the age and 
gender. Our mean and standard deviations for impulsivity, 
hyperactivity and index scores were within half a standard 
deviation from the proposed mean and standard deviations 
for CAARS-S:S. The mean for the inattention scores was 
half a standard deviation above the proposed mean but still 
within the confidence interval values. One participant also 
reported previous ADHD diagnosis, whereas two partici-
pants preferred not to state. Please see Fig. 2 for detailed 
participant characteristics.
Analysis of general switch costs RTs for incorrect responses 
and trials following incorrect responses and the data points 
two standard deviation above and below the mean (1.4%) 
were removed before the analysis.
Predictable task switching paradigm. We conducted a 
2 (condition: low load, high load) × 2 (transition: repeat, 
switch) repeated measures ANOVA to evaluate the switch 
cost (see also Fig. 3). A transition main effect indicated that 
overall RTs were higher on switch (M = 1189.76, SE 22.05) 
than repeat (M = 785.31, SE 9.94) trials [F(1, 102) = 457.12, 
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.82] while the condition main effect was not 
significant, F(1, 102) = 2.02, p = 0.158, η2 = 0.02.
There was a significant condition × transition interac-
tion, F(1, 102) = 44.34, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.30. Bonferroni 
corrected paired samples t tests revealed that in the low 
load condition, responses to switch trials (M = 1226.99, 
SE 24.93) were slower than repeat trials (M = 738.74, SE 
10.46), t(108) = 23.23, p < 0.001. Same effect was observed 
in the high load condition [switch: M = 1156.29, SE 27.51; 
repeat: M = 839.26, SE 14.46), t(106) = 13.91, p < 0.001].We 
also found that in the high load condition, repeat trials were 
slower [t(104) = 6.87, p < 0.001] while switch trials were 
faster compared to the low load condition [t(109) = 2.41, 
p = 0.017]. However, this difference did not reach signifi-
cance following Bonferroni correction (Pcorrected = 0.013). 
To test the effect of WM load on task switching, we com-
pared the switch cost across conditions. Paired samples 
t tests revealed that switch costs were higher in the low 
load (M = 474.82, SE 20.54) compared to the high load 
(M = 322.98, SE 22.69) condition t(101) = − 6.54, p < 0.001.
We next analysed the switch and repeat RTs for con-
gruent and incongruent conditions separately. Bonfer-
roni corrected paired samples t tests revealed that RTs to 
switch trials were longer than repeat trials in all condi-
tions: for low load, switch trials took longer than repeat tri-
als for congruent [switch: M = 1192.78, SE 25.41; repeat: 
Fig. 2  Number of participants 
in Study 1 falling into each 
category and the corresponding 
T scores in brackets based on 
CAARS-S:S guidelines
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M = 733.81, SE 11.29, t(110) = 21.64, p < 0.001] and incon-
gruent stimuli [switch: M = 1268.67, SE 25.38; repeat: 
M = 751.95, SE 12.19, t(107) = 23.60, p < 0.001]. Simi-
larly, for high load, switch trials took longer than repeat tri-
als for congruent [switch: M = 1116.60, SE 28.78; repeat: 
M =844.72 = 839.26, SE 16.83, t(109) = 11.17, p < 0.001] 
and incongruent stimuli [switch: M = 1221.20, SE 29.18; 
repeat: M = 834.28, SE 15.33, t(107) = 15.06, p < 0.001].
Unpredictable task switching paradigm. We conducted a 
2 (RSI: short, long) × 2 (transition: repeat, switch) repeated 
measures ANOVA to evaluate the switching cost and the 
effect of RSI. A transition main effect indicated that overall 
RTs were higher in switch (M = 627.12, SE 6.27) than repeat 
(M = 602.37, SE 6.27) condition, F(1, 89) = 80.61, p < 0.001, 
η2 = 0.48. However, the RSI main effect [F(1, 89) = 0.41, 
p = 0.525, η2 = 0.01] and RSI × transition interaction [F(1, 
89) = 2.69, p = 0.104, η2 = 0.03] were not significant, indicat-
ing that the RSI manipulation was not effective.
Inattention and task switching
We examined the bivariate correlations between the inde-
pendent and dependent variables (Table 1). Pearson corre-
lation coefficients revealed significant positive correlations 
between inattention scores and switch cost when the tasks 
were predictable. Inattention was correlated to predictable 
switch costs in low load (r = 0.19, p =0.05) and high load 
(r = 0.26, p < 0.01) conditions. We also measured the switch 
costs separately for stimulus congruency: in the low WM 
condition, inattention significantly correlated with the switch 
costs when the stimuli were incongruent (r = 0.22, p = 0.03) 
but this correlation was no longer significant in the high 
WM load condition. In contrast, in the high WM condition, 
inattention was correlated with the switch costs of congruent 
(r = 0.19, p = 0.05) but not incongruent stimuli. Furthermore, 
inattention was not significantly correlated with the switch 
costs when the task order was unpredictable (short RSI: 
r = 0.02, p = 0.88; long RSI: r = 0.08, p = 0.41).
We ran multiple regression analysis to investigate the 
role of ADHD traits when explaining switch costs. We also 
used Bayes Factors (B) to assess the strength of evidence in 
support of hypotheses when the p value for the predictors 
was not significant. We followed Dienes (2014) to assess 
the strength of evidence in support of hypotheses when the 
p value for the predictors was not significant. Where a Bayes 
Factor is given, we modelled the predictions of the theory of 
some evidence for a relationship with a half-normal whose 
mean and standard deviation values were taken from Cepeda 
et al. (2000): experiment 1 for predictable and experiment 2 
for unpredictable TSPs due to the similarity of the procedure 
to our study. We used the value of r square (coefficient of 
determination) to calculate Bayes Factor where the regres-
sion model was non-significant (using BayesFactor pack-
age of R software, Liang, Paulo, Molina, Clyde, & Berger, 
2008).
For predictable switch costs under high load, the mul-
tiple regression analysis revealed that the model (Table 2) 
explained 9% of the variation, F(3, 106) = 3.27, p = 0.02. 
Hyperactivity (p = 0.131, BH(0, 0.422) = 0.04) and impulsivity 
(p = 0.926, BH(0, 0.422) = 0.04) were non-significant predic-
tors with Bayes Factors providing strong evidence for the 
null. Thus, inattention was the only predictor of the pre-
dictable switch cost under high WM load. The regression 
model where ADHD traits predict the switch costs in the low 
load condition of the predictable task was not significant and 
the Bayes Factor provided strong evidence for the null F(3, 
107) = 1.57, p = 0.20, B = 0.16.
Fig. 3  Average RTs in Study 1 based on the conditions of the stimuli in predictable and unpredictable task switching paradigms
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Due to the significant correlations, we ran multiple linear 
regression models to investigate whether inattention, hyper-
activity and impulsivity predicted the switch cost based on 
congruency. Switch cost to incongruent stimuli in the low 
load condition [F(3, 107) = 2.13, p = 0.101, B = 0.31], and, 
the switch cost to congruent stimuli in the high load condi-
tion [F(3, 109) = 1.47, p = 0.227, B = 0.04] yielded non-sig-
nificant results. Bayes values also revealed strong evidence 
for the null hypothesis of no difference.
Discussion
We employed predictable and unpredictable task switching 
paradigms (TSPs) to investigate whether self-reported inat-
tention is related to a general task switching impairment, a 
limitation in inhibition, or, in line with research showing 
a relationship between inattention and working memory 
(WM), an impairment specifically related to predictable task 
switching. The predictable TSP required participants to keep 
the task order available in WM and use this information to 
predict the next task to be performed, a form of proactive 
control. In the unpredictable TSP, the task order changed in 
a pseudo-random order, not allowing participants to prepare 
or to use previous information to work out the upcoming 
task. Therefore, the unpredictable task primarily required 
reactive control.
Given the negative relationship between the WM capacity 
and inattention even in subclinical populations (Elisa et al., 
2016; Lui and Tannock, 2007), we predicted that inatten-
tive traits would be more related to the higher switch costs 
during predictable switching as the task requires the use of 
proactive control. Moreover, it was predicted that the rela-
tionship between inattentive traits and switch costs would be 
stronger when the task involved a higher WM load (in the 
cue-absent condition). As predicted, we found that inatten-
tive traits predicted greater switch costs in the predictable 
TSP but only under high WM load conditions. Bayes values 
provided evidence towards no relationship between hyper-
activity/impulsivity and the switch cost under predictable 
task switching conditions and for no relationship between 
the ADHD-related traits and switch costs in the unpredict-
able TSP.
It is interesting that inattention was related to poorer per-
formance on what is essentially an easier task since the task 
changed in a predictable manner and thus it was possible to 
prepare the correct task set in advance. Such impairment 
fits well with the problems with planning and organisation 
associated with inattention. To benefit from the preparation, 
participants had to keep the task order available in WM and 
use this information to identify the next task. Our results 
suggest that those with inattention are specifically impaired 
at this preparatory activity. Whilst we found that inattentive 
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traits were positively correlated with switch costs in the cue-
present condition, this relationship was not predictive.
We also measured switch costs separate for congruent 
and incongruent stimuli since the literature suggested that 
larger switch costs for ADHD may be driven by the switch 
costs for incongruent (RTs to incongruent switch trials—
RTs to incongruent repeat trials) rather than congruent (RTs 
to congruent switch—RTs to congruent repeat trials) stimuli 
(Cepeda et al., 2000). As noted above the ADHD index score 
did not predict any switch costs in our study contrasting with 
the findings from Cepeda et al. (albeit in a subclinical popu-
lation). However, our analysis revealed that inattention was 
correlated to incongruent trial switch costs, but only under 
low WM load. Inattention was also correlated with congru-
ent trial switch costs, but only under high WM load. How-
ever, inattention did not predict the magnitude of either of 
these indicating that in our data at least inattention does not 
lead to increased switch costs as a result of trial congruency.
Consistent with Liefooghe et al. (2008), switch costs were 
modified by WM. In the predictable TSP, responses to the 
repeat trials were longer in the high compared to the low WM 
load condition, indicating an effect of WM load in the expected 
direction. However, responses to the switch trials were quicker 
in the high (cue absent) compared to the low (cue present) WM 
load condition. We also found that the switch costs decreased 
in the high compared to low WM load condition (Fig. 3). This 
could be due to the type of control executed by the partici-
pants. The cue-present condition involved proactive and/or 
reactive control depending on the strategy (keeping track of the 
order or benefiting the cue) to perform the task; keeping track 
of the task order allowed participants to prepare in advance 
as they figure out the next stimuli from the maintained task 
order and this could happen before the next stimulus appears. 
Utilising the cue did not allow advanced preparation. That is, 
in the cue-present condition, participants could choose from 
the two strategies for responding. The cue-absent (high WM 
load) condition, however, forced participants to keep track of 
the order which may have encouraged advance preparation, 
thereby reducing response times to the switch trials in the cue-
absent (high WM load) compared to the cue-present (low WM 
load) condition. This supports the notion that inattentive traits 
uniquely predicted the switch costs when WM was needed 
to perform proactive control for advanced preparation (cue-
absent condition of predictable TSP).
To summarise the results from Study 1, we found that only 
inattentive traits significantly predicted task switching perfor-
mance. This was only observed when switching was predict-
able and trial order was not indicated by a cue, suggesting that 
it was the requirement to track task order and utilise proactive 
control that led to larger switch costs in those with high lev-
els of inattention. Furthermore, none of the ADHD-related 
tendencies were correlated to switch costs in an unpredict-
able TSP. These findings indicate that the impairment in WM 
associated with inattention can lead to task switching impair-
ments and that the failure to observe a consistent relationship 
between ADHD and task switching performance in previous 
studies is likely due to the failure to consider the differential 
influence of the core symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity 
and impulsivity. However, these conclusions are mitigated by 
certain limitations in the experimental design. First, the ability 
to keep track of the task order and use proactive control was 
confounded in the present study. Second, the predictable and 
unpredictable paradigms differed in several ways: (1) the stim-
uli in the predictable TSP were bivalent while the unpredict-
able TSP had univalent stimuli; (2) the RSI was manipulated 
in the unpredictable TSP only leading to differences in time 
constraints between the predictable and unpredictable tasks. 
Finally, whilst there are a number of participants falling into 
each category that is spread normally (see Fig. 2), the hyper-
active and impulsive scores were numerically more restricted 
than the inattention scores, which could have reduced the like-
lihood of observing a relationship between these symptoms 
and task switching performance (although assuming a linear 
relationship, we believe this would not have had a significant 
impact on the results).
Study 2
Study 1 revealed that self-reported inattentive traits uniquely 
predicted higher switch costs in a predictable task switch-
ing paradigm in which working memory (WM) was needed 
to track task order while unpredictable switching was not 
related to any of the ADHD symptoms. However, the tasks 
differed more than in predictability. Therefore, in the present 
Table 2  Summary of regression 
model for inattention, 
hyperactivity and impulsivity 
scores on switch cost in high 
working memory load condition 
in Study 1
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Variable b SEb β T R2 Adjusted R2 Semi-
partial cor-
relation
Inattention 7.75 2.68 0.32 2.89** 0.09 0.06 0.27
Hyperactivity − 4.74 3.12 − 0.17 − 1.52  − 0.15
Impulsivity 0.31 3.33 0.01 0.09 0.01
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study we addressed the methodological issues raised above 
using bivalent stimuli in both the predictable and unpredict-
able TSP and eschewing an RSI manipulation. In addition, 
the present study also sought to identify factors that might 
lead to a relationship between inattention and predictable 
task switching performance.
For those participants high in inattention the factor limit-
ing performance in Study 1 was either the need to keep track 
of the order of repeat and switch trials or the need to utilise 
preparatory proactive control when the order was known. 
Given the predictable and basic nature of the sequence, the 
participants should have been able to take advantage of the 
simple sequence to improve their performance and proac-
tively prepare for each upcoming trial. Inattention did not 
predict performance when there was environmental support 
for tracking task order. Clearly when the location cued the 
task was to be performed, the need for a contribution from 
working memory to track task order was reduced. Such a 
result could be explained by either an impairment in working 
memory or in the use of proactive control. In Study 1 these 
factors were confounded.
In the present experiment, participants were asked to 
complete five blocks of task switching where task order was 
either predictable (a trackable sequence engaging WM) or it 
was unpredictable. The task was cued with two frames (an 
advanced cue presented before the stimulus and stimulus 
cue presented with the stimulus) in black, red or blue. The 
coloured cue indicated which task to perform while black 
cue was uninformative. Moreover, in some blocks coloured 
advanced cue enabled participants to engage in proactive 
control and some blocks included a coloured stimulus cue 
that permitted participants to utilise reactive control to select 
the correct task set. The five block types were the following: 
(1) a predictable task switching order with black advanced 
cue on any trial but a coloured stimulus cue indicating the 
task to be performed; this condition is referred to as Order 
PC/RC because the predictable order permitted the use of 
proactive control and the stimulus colour cue permitted the 
use of reactive control; (2) a random task switching order 
with coloured advanced cue on every trial and a coloured 
stimulus cue indicating the task to be performed; this condi-
tion is referred to as Random PC/RC because the order was 
random and the advanced cue permitted the use of proac-
tive control and the stimulus colour cue permitted the use 
of reactive control; (3) a predictable task switching order 
with black advanced cue and black stimulus cue indicating 
the task to be performed; this condition is referred to as 
Order PC because the predictable order permitted the use 
of proactive control (this condition is the condition most 
similar to the high WM load condition of Study 1); (4) an 
unpredictable task switching order with a coloured advanced 
cue on every trial but black stimulus cue indicating the task 
to be performed; this condition is referred to as Random PC 
because the order was random and the advanced cue permit-
ted the use of proactive control; (5) an unpredictable task 
switching order in which a coloured stimulus cue permit-
ted the use of reactive control; the condition is referred to 
as Random RC. This design permits the de-confounding of 
working memory load and proactive control. If inattention 
was related to impairment in the use of proactive control, 
it would be related to performance in any block that pre-
sents an advanced cue (Random PC/RC or Random PC). If 
inattention was related to working memory impairments, it 
would be related to performance in any block/condition that 
has a predictable sequence and involves the need to keep 
track of the order of switch and repeat trials (Order PC/RC 
or Order PC), but especially Order PC where no other cue 
is provided about which task to perform (thereby replicat-
ing Study 1). If inattention was related to an impairment in 
reactive control it would affect performance most clearly in 
the random RC block.
The de-confounding of working memory and proactive 
control is a necessary step in identifying the determining 
factor producing the relationship between predictable task 
switching and inattention. However, in the present study 
we also considered another potential contributor to this 
result. Specifically, Elisa et al. (2016) reported a relation-
ship between working memory performance and subclinical 
symptoms of ADHD. The only working memory related task 
that was uniquely related to inattention was a letter monitor-
ing task that measured the tendency for goal neglect. In goal 
neglect, although instructions are understood and not forgot-
ten (a representation of the task is created; Duncan, Emslie, 
Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996; Duncan et al., 2008) 
participants behaviourally fail to follow these instructions 
(Duncan et al., 1996). Duncan et al. explained the occur-
rence of goal neglect with reference to competition in the 
task model: in order to perform complex tasks, individuals 
need a body of knowledge composed of all relevant facts 
and instructions (the task model) where the cue-action map-
pings with sufficient saliency are constructed. The model 
should be organised into small chunks of information to be 
retrieved when relevant triggering conditions occur. As the 
information in the task model is increased (e.g. by increasing 
the complexity in the task instructions), multiple task com-
ponents compete to be represented. Due to limited capacity 
in some individuals, some of the task components are too 
weakly represented to be used when needed, resulting in 
goal neglect (Duncan et al., 1996, 2008). When asked, par-
ticipants can re-report the instructions in full, but it is the use 
of components of the task model during task performance 
that is impaired. Goal neglect has been linked to the lapses 
in WM (Kane and Engle, 2003; Duncan, Schramm, Thomp-
son, & Dumontheil, 2012) and fluid intelligence which is 
related to cognitive control functions (Duncan et al., 1995; 
Kane and Engle, 2003; Marshalek, Lohman, & Snow, 1983; 
Psychological Research 
1 3
Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Wittman, 2003). Along with 
various measures of WM, Elisa et al. (2016) also measured 
the link between inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity 
and goal neglect based on the notion that those with inat-
tention have problems receiving verbal instructions. They 
showed that inattention was uniquely related to goal neglect 
even when controlling for fluid IQ.
The original conception of goal neglect has been influ-
ential and other researchers have extended the concept. De 
Jong (2001) proposed the notion of the failure to engage 
hypothesis and referred to this as goal neglect. De Jong 
(2000) argued that the residual switch cost, a cost, even after 
being given time to prepare for an upcoming trial, remains 
because participants occasionally fail to engage and main-
tain goal-related preparation (but see Mayr and Keele, 2000; 
Rogers and Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 
2001 for an alternative view). According to the failure to 
engage hypothesis, individuals sometimes fail to take the 
opportunity to perform preparation. Given the link between 
inattention and increased reports of goal neglect, we hypoth-
esised that the link between inattentive traits and increased 
predictable switch costs could be moderated by goal neglect. 
If this is supported by the data, then it would support the 
notion that goal neglect is an important contributor to the 
experience of inattention.
Method
Participants
As with Study 1 we collected data from 120 (different) indi-
viduals (M = 20.55, SD 2.31). Participants aged between 18 
and 33 with normal or corrected vision from non-clinical 
samples were recruited through Bournemouth University’s 
research participation system and through advertisements. 
Participants were mainly undergraduate and postgraduate 
students. Undergraduate students received course credits for 
their involvement.
Materials
Adult ADHD self report scale (ASRS) We used ASRS to 
measure ADHD-related traits (Adler, Spencer, Faraone, 
Kessler, Howes, Biederman, & Secnik, 2006; Kessler et al., 
2005). In order to show that the results of the first study were 
not specific to the scale employed (CAARS-S:S), in the cur-
rent study, ASRS was used as an alternative scale. ASRS 
includes total of 18 items consisting the ADHD symptoms 
of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
Fourth edition (DSM-IV). There are nine items indicating 
inattentive symptoms (1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) and nine 
items indicating hyperactive/impulsive symptoms (5, 6, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18). ASRS asks participants how often a 
particular symptom of ADHD has occurred to them over the 
past 6 months on a five-point response scale ranging from 
“never” (0), “rarely” (1), “sometimes” (2), “often” (3), to 
“very often” (4). The ASRS was scored by averaging the 
participants’ ratings across the responses in each symptom 
cluster, providing us a continuous scale (Overbey et  al., 
2011; Whalen, Jamner, Henker, Gehricke, & King, 2003).
Task switching paradigm The task required partici-
pants to perform two types of tasks: participants were 
required to decide if the digit was even or odd (even/odd 
task) or if the digit was lower or higher than five. Avail-
able responses (‘z’ and ‘m’) counterbalanced across par-
ticipants. The task comprises two conditions where the 
pure condition required only one type of task throughout 
the block while the mixed condition required frequent 
switches between two tasks. There were two blocks for 
the pure condition (one block for each type of task) pre-
sented in random order. Pure blocks were designed to 
make participants familiar with each type of task and 
learn stimulus–response associations. It was also aimed to 
test participants’ ability to perform each task. Participants 
performed total of 16 practice and 64 experimental trials 
for the pure condition. The Mixed Condition included five 
blocks presented in random order. Each block included 
16 practice and 96 experimental trials. Stimuli consisted 
of digits between one and nine except five, presented in 
Courier New Bold in 36 points (bold). Before the stimulus 
presentation, a square with 2.8  cm length appeared as a 
cue (advanced cue) and stayed on the screen as a frame for 
the stimulus (stimulus cue). Depending on the block, the 
frame was either red, blue or black. The colours red and 
blue indicated the task to be performed (counterbalanced 
across participants). At the beginning of each block, par-
ticipants were asked to make a key press when they were 
ready. A 2000-ms blank screen followed the key press. 
Each trial started with the square frame; then, the stimulus 
was presented inside the frame after 250 ms. The stimulus 
was present until the response (maximum response dura-
tion was 5000  ms). Following an error, a reminder for 
the rules appeared on the screen for 1200 ms. Please see 
Fig. 4 for a depiction of the sequence of events.
In the Random PC/RC block, both the advanced cue and 
the stimulus cue were coloured indicating the task to be per-
formed. Hence, participants had the opportunity to attend the 
advanced cue or the stimulus cue. The advanced cue allowed 
advanced preparation and the use of proactive control, while 
the stimulus cue did not. Instead, the stimulus cue required 
participants to engage in reactive control where the cognitive 
processes are triggered by the stimulus presentation. The 
tasks were presented in a random order.
In the Order PC/RC block followed the same proce-
dure as the previous blocks, except that the tasks were 
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presented in a set order (AABB…). The stimulus cue was 
presented in red or blue, indicating the task to be per-
formed. Therefore, participants could either keep track of 
the task order or wait for the stimulus cue to figure out the 
required task. Keeping track allowed advanced prepara-
tion (proactive control) while attending the stimulus cue 
required reactive control.
In the Random PC block, the advanced cue was pre-
sented in red or blue, indicating the upcoming task. The 
frame then turned to black. Since participants had to focus 
on the advanced cue to figure out the next task, they were 
strongly encouraged to engage in advanced preparation. 
The tasks were presented in a random order.
The Order PC block, similar to Order PC/RC block, 
the tasks were presented in a set order (AABB…). Both 
the advanced cue and the stimulus cue were always black, 
forcing participants to keep track of the task order to find 
out the task to be performed. Keeping track of the task 
order allowed participants to know the upcoming task 
before stimulus presentation, hence strongly encouraging 
advanced preparation.
Finally, in the random RC condition, tasks were in ran-
dom order and were indicated by the stimulus cue, allow-
ing only the use of reactive control. Therefore, this block 
involved unpredictable switching.
Automated operation span task Automated version of 
operation span task taken from Unsworth et al. (2005) was 
used as a measure of working memory capacity. The task 
required participants to remember the letters and solve 
mathematical problems in between as the distraction (Uns-
worth et al., 2005). Mathematical problems and letters were 
presented one at a time in the centre of the screen. Partici-
pants reported the sequence of letters by choosing among 
possible letters from a 4 by 3 matrix of possible letters (F, 
H, J, K, L, N, P, Q, R, S, T, and Y). For the mathematical 
operations, participants were told to solve the mathematical 
operation as quickly as possible and press a mouse button 
when ready. Next, participants were asked to report if the 
number presented on the screen is the correct solution of the 
mathematical problem by clicking on either the true or the 
false button.
Participants completed a practice session with simple let-
ter span following another block of 15 mathematical prob-
lems only. In the experimental condition, letters appeared 
on the screen for 800 ms while recall phase was untimed. 
After the recall, an accuracy feedback for both operations 
was provided. Following the practice sessions for letter 
recall and mathematical problems, participants had a final 
practice combining both operations, identical to the experi-
mental condition. In the experimental condition, sequences 
of mathematical problems and letters were presented. There 
were three sets from each possible set size (3–7 letters to 
remember and mathematical problems to solve). Thus, in 
total, 75 letters and 75 mathematical problems were pre-
sented. Scores are calculated by adding the number of letters 
recalled in the correct order (also known as the partial score; 
Turner & Engle, 1989). Participants below the 85% accuracy 
Fig. 4  Example demonstration for the blocks of mixed condition in the task switching paradigm in Study 2
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were not included in the analysis to ensure that participants 
were attempting to perform both operations.
Letter monitoring task The letter monitoring task was taken 
from Duncan et al. (1996) as a measure of goal neglect. In 
the letter monitoring task, participants are presented with 
pairs of letters or digits on the left and right side of a cen-
tral dot. The task is to ignore the digit trials and read aloud 
the letters on the directed side on the letter trials. Each trial 
included the presentation of 13 pairs of digits/letters (Fig. 5). 
Digits were chosen from the set 1–8, and letters were ran-
domly chosen without replacement from the letters of the 
alphabet (except D, I, O, V, and W). Following the instruc-
tions of Duncan et al., participants were first prompted by 
a “READY?” message. Following the participant’s posi-
tive response via verbal report, the experimenter made a 
key press to initiate a 500-ms blank interval after which the 
practice trial began. Each trial started with the presentation 
of the instruction “WATCH LEFT” or “WATCH RIGHT” 
for 1 s indicating the side from which the participant was 
required to report the letters. The message was followed 
a by a further 1-s interval for the participant to get ready 
for the upcoming stimulus sequence. Each stimulus screen 
consisted of either a pair of digits or letters presented for 
200  ms followed by a blank interval of 200  ms. Initially, 
there were ten pairs. After the 10th pair, the cue with a “+” 
or “−” symbol was presented in the centre of the screen for 
200 ms. A “+” sign indicated to the participant that they 
must attend to the right while “−” sign indicated to attend 
to the left side of the dot (again reporting only from trials 
with letters). Following a further 200 ms, three more pairs 
were presented. After the symbol, the first pair was always 
digits and the last two were always letters. Thus, each trial 
had total of 13 pairs of digits or letters. Please see Fig. 5 for 
an example trial. A scoring sheet with correct answers was 
prepared for the experimenter in advance to manually record 
the participant’s responses.
To ensure that the cue was remembered correctly, pieces 
of paper were placed on the appropriate side of the computer 
monitor with “PLUS” (for the right) and “MINUS” (for the 
left) signs written on them. All participants were instructed 
to: (1) read aloud the letters and ignore the digits; (2) ini-
tially report from the side instructed by the message on the 
screen (until the cue is presented); (3) then use the cue (+ or 
− sign) to attend the correct side for the next three pairs. The 
task comprised three blocks of 12 experimental trials (with 
13 pairs presented in each trial) with 3 sub-blocks (4 trials 
each) within each block. Participants also received a practice 
trial which was repeated until at least one letter was reported 
from either (correct or incorrect) side and the “+/−” cue 
was reported accurately. For some trials, participants had 
to change the attended side (e.g. a WATCHLEFT message 
followed by the + cue which indicates attending right) while 
others did not require a change (e.g. a WATCHLEFT mes-
sage followed by the − cue which indicates attending left). 
To equalise the number of trials with change and no change, 
in each successive trial of four, there was one “WATCH 
LEFT” followed by a “−” cue, one “WATCH LEFT” fol-
lowed by a “+” cue, one “WATCH RIGHT” followed by a 
“−” cue, and, one “WATCH RIGHT” followed by a “+” cue 
presented in random order. Participants were asked to repeat 
the rule again between each block. Instructions for the task 
were provided following Duncan et al.’s (1996) instructions.
Scoring A correct response was defined as the following 
of the cue instruction. Participants received a score of 1 for 
each letter reported from the correct side. A perfect trial 
included a score of two with two letters reported from the 
correct side. There were two requirements for scores to be 
counted. First, for the trials to be valid, participants had to 
report at least three letters from the appropriate side indi-
cated by the initial message (“WATCH LEFT”/“WATCH 
RIGHT”). This was to ensure that participants attended to 
the side indicated by the initial message. Second, partici-
pants had to report at least one valid change and one valid 
no-change trial to pass each sub-block. The final score was 
Fig. 5  An example demonstration of a letter monitoring task trial 
(used in Study 2) taken from Duncan et  al. (1996). Starting from 
the top to bottom, “Watch RIGHT” message (1 s) is followed by the 
pairs. Each pair is presented in a separate screen for 200 ms with a 
blank interval of 200 ms
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computed by the sum of the each passed sub-block. Scores 
indicate to what extend a participant’s performance was 
affected by the cue.
Raven’s standard progressive matrices (SPM; shortened ver‑
sion) We used Raven’s standard progressive matrices to 
measure fluid intelligence as it is related to goal neglect and 
working memory performance (Duncan et al., 2008; Kane, 
Hambrick, & Conway, 2005). Participants SPM scores 
were also entered into the regression analysis as a predictor 
variable to ensure the predictive value of goal neglect and 
working memory were not simply as result of the variance 
these measures share with fluid intelligence. In the short-
ened Raven SPM (Bouma, Mulder, & Lindeboom, 1996), 
three sets of items from the original version (Sets B, C, and 
D) were administered as an indicator of fluid intelligence. 
Each item consisted of a matrix of black and white elements 
composing an overall pattern (rule). Participants were asked 
to complete this pattern by choosing the correct missing ele-
ment among multiple possible options. There was no time 
limit in completing the test. Each item was scored either 1 
(correct) or 0 (incorrect). Administration and scoring were 
carried out based on the guidelines provided in the SPM 
manual (Raven, 1938).
Procedure
The present study included: the ASRS for measuring ADHD 
related tendencies, Task Switching Paradigm, OSPAN as 
a working memory measure, Letter Monitoring Task as a 
measure of goal neglect (and Feature Matching Task), and 
SPM as a control measure of fluid abilities for the goal 
neglect measures. After providing the participant informa-
tion sheet and the informed consent, tasks were administered 
in counterbalanced order.
Results
Scores from ASRS ranged between zero and four. Mean 
scores and standard deviations for ASRS are reported in 
Table 3. The mean scores of inattention were again higher 
than those for hyperactivity/impulsivity and total ADHD 
scores but this difference was within 1 standard deviation 
above and below the mean. Outliers 2SD above and below 
the mean were removed for SPM (3.33%), Random PC/
RC (5%), Order PC/RC (5%), Random PC (5.8%), Order 
PC (5.8%), and Random RC (5%) due to non-normal dis-
tributions. The OSPAN scores for the participants scoring 
below 85% accuracy on math questions were also removed 
(7.5%). Participants were only excluded for specific parts of 
the experiment if their performance was deemed as outliers 
for that part of the experiment. Total of 52 out of 1200 data 
points (4.33%) were removed across all analyses.
Analysis of switch costs
RTs for incorrect responses and trials following incorrect 
responses were not analysed. We found switch costs for all 
conditions (Fig. 6). Bonferroni corrected paired samples t 
tests revealed that responses to switch trials [Random PC/
RC: M = 1187.01, SD 253.83; Order PC/RC: M = 1256.18, 
SD 222.33; Random PC: M = 1201.34, SD 314.13; Order 
PC: M = 989.48, SD 278.25; Random: M = 1226.58, SD 
199.17] were slower than repeat trials [Random PC/RC: 
M = 796.63, SD 145.49; Order PC/RC: M = 829.20; SD 
178.52; Random PC: M = 1008.13, SD 231.93; Order PC: 
M = 763.19, SD 163.34; Random: M = 884.62, SD 125.24] 
in Random PC/RC [t(102) = 17.47, p < 0.001], Order PC/
RC [t(104) = 23.95, p < 0.001], Random PC [t(102) = 10.51, 
p < 0.001], Order PC [t(104) = 10.68, p < 0.001], Random 
[t(102) = 21.94, p < 0.001].
Table 3  Correlations between variables in Study 2
*p < 0.01, **p < 0.005
N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Inattention 120 2.06 0.69 –
2. Hyp/Imp 120 1.45 0.73 0.51** –
3. ADHD total 120 1.76 0.62 0.86** 0.88** –
4. SPM 116 31.27 2.67 − 0.02 − 0.02 − 0.02 –
5. Letter monitoring 120 4.48 4.27 − 0.19* − 0.02 − 0.11 0.31** –
6. OSPAN 111 55.45 11.70 − 0.29** − 0.22* − 0.29** 0.07 0.29** –
7. Random PC/RC 114 434.80 246.58 0.20* − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.02 − 0.26** − 0.13 –
8. Order PC/RC 114 429.51 219.33 0.22* 0.09 0.18 0.15 − 0.22* − 0.11 0.37** –
9. Random PC 113 205.44 223.09 − 0.03 − 0.08 − 0.07 − 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.31** 0.21* –
10. Order PC 113 241.81 236.81 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.40** 0.07 − 0.02 0.05 0.31** 0.04 –
11. Random 114 352.69 207.48 0.09 − 0.02 0.04 0.20* − 0.17 − 0.10 0.44** 0.53** 0.21* 0.17 –
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Pearson correlation coefficients revealed significant cor-
relations (Table 3). Inattention was correlated with letter 
monitoring (r = − 0.19, p =0.04) and OSPAN (r = − 0.29, 
p =0.002) scores. Inattention was also correlated to switch 
costs in random PC/RC (r = 0.20, p = 0.04) and order PC/RC 
(r = 0.22, p = 0.018) conditions. Composite scores of ADHD 
were also correlated to OSPAN (r = − 0.29, p =0.002). 
Scores of SPM were correlated with letter monitoring 
(r = 0.31, p =0.001), task switching in random (r = 0.20, 
p =0.038) and order PC (r = 0.40, p <0.001) conditions.
We used Bayes Factors (B) to assess the strength of evi-
dence in support of hypotheses when the p value for the 
predictors was not significant. We followed Dienes (2014) 
to assess the strength of evidence in support of hypothe-
ses when the p value for the predictors was not significant. 
Where a Bayes Factor is given, we modelled the predictions 
of the theory of some evidence for a relationship with a 
half-normal whose mean and standard deviation values were 
taken from the variable inattention in the model.
Inattention and goal neglect
We ran multiple regression analysis where inattentive and 
hyperactive/impulsive traits were used as predictors for let-
ter monitoring performance (Table 4). The model explained 
14% of the variation in, F(3, 115) = 5.98, p < 0.001. SPM 
and inattention were the significant predictors where hyper-
activity/impulsivity was non-significant with Bayes Factors 
providing evidence for the null (p = 0.292, BH(0, 0.636) = 0.26). 
The prior was taken from the variable inattention from the 
same model.
Inattention and working memory
We ran multiple regression analysis where inattentive and 
hyperactive/impulsive traits were used as predictors for Opera-
tion Span Task performance (Table 5). The model for random 
PC/RC explained 10% of the variation in, F(3, 106) = 3.81, 
p = 0.012. Inattention was a significant predictor, whereas 
hyperactivity/impulsivity (p = 0.592, BH(0, 1.801) = 0.17) and 
SPM (p = 0.609, BH(0, 1.801) = 0.04) were non-significant with 
Bayes Factors providing evidence for the null.
Inattention and task switching
Due to the significant correlation, we ran multiple regres-
sion analysis to investigate the role of ADHD traits when 
explaining switch costs for the random PC/RC and order 
PC/RC conditions where the use of both proactive control 
and reactive control was possible.
The multiple regression analysis revealed that the 
model explained 6% of the variation, F(2, 106) = 3.18, 
Fig. 6  RTs of the switch costs in each condition for Study 2. Error 
bars indicate standard error
Table 4  Summary of regression 
model for inattention and 
hyperactivity/impulsivity scores 
on letter monitoring scores 
when controlling for SPM 
scores (Study 2)
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Variable b SEb β T R2 Adjusted R2 Semi-
partial cor-
relation
SPM 0.49 0.14 0.30 3.46** 0.14 0.12 0.31
Inattention − 1.52 0.65 − 0.25 − 2.39* − 0.22
Hyperactivity/
impulsivity
0.63 0.60 0.11 1.06 0.10
Table 5  Summary of regression 
model for inattention and 
hyperactivity/impulsivity 
scores on OSPAN scores when 
controlling for SPM scores 
(Study 2)
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Variable b SEb β T R2 Adjusted R2 Semi-
partial cor-
relation
SPM 0.21 0.41 0.05 3.46 0.10 0.07 0.05
Inattention − 4.59 1.80 − 0.28 − 2.55* − 0.24
Hyperactivity/
impulsivity
− 0.89 1.66 − 0.06 − 0.54  − 0.05
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p = 0.046 (Table 6). Hyperactivity/Impulsivity (p = 0.159, 
BH(0, 30.03) = 0.12) was non-significant with Bayes Factors 
providing evidence for the null. Thus, inattention was the 
only predictor of the predictable switch cost.
The multiple regression analysis revealed that the model 
for the order PC/RC switch costs explained 8% of the vari-
ation, F(3, 110) = 2.92, p = 0.037 (Table 7). Hyperactiv-
ity/Impulsivity (p = 0.722, BH(0, 34.926) = 0.12) and SPM 
(p = 0.110, BH(0, 34.926) = 0.14) were non-significant predic-
tors with Bayes Factors providing evidence for the null. 
Thus, inattention was the only predictor of the predictable 
switch cost. Since SPM was correlated with switch costs in 
random PC/RC, it was included in the model as a control 
variable.
We also ran a mediation analysis using PROCESS Ver-
sion 3.0 (Hayes, 2018), to investigate a potential mediating 
role for letter monitoring performance on the relationship 
of inattention scores with switch costs on random PC/RC 
and order PC/RC conditions when controlling for hyper-
activity/impulsivity and SPM scores. We found inattention 
was no longer a significant predictor after accounting for 
the letter monitoring scores, and, letter monitoring was 
a significant predictor for random (β = − 0.25, p = 0.020) 
and order (β = − 0.26, p = 0.011) PC/RC conditions. Thus, 
letter monitoring scores mediated the link between inat-
tention scores and the switch costs on PC/RC conditions 
when the use of both proactive and reactive control was 
possible (Fig. 7).
Discussion
The present study had two aims: (1) to de-confound aspects 
of the design of Study 1 that rendered it difficult to interpret 
the relationship reported between predictable task switching 
and inattention (stimulus valency, the presence of an RSI 
manipulation design permits the de-confounding of work-
ing memory load and proactive control); (2) to investigate 
whether the relationship between inattention and predictable 
task switching is moderated by goal neglect. It was noted 
that if inattention were related to impairment in the use of 
proactive control it would be related to performance in any 
block that presents an advanced cue (Random PC/RC or 
Random PC). Alternatively, if inattention were related to 
working memory impairments it would be related to per-
formance in any block;/condition that has a predictable 
sequence and involves the need to keep track of the order 
of switch and repeat trials (Order PC/RC or Order PC), but 
especially Order PC where no other cue is provided about 
which task to perform. Finally, if inattention were related 
to an impairment in reactive control it would affect perfor-
mance most clearly in the Random RC block. We also con-
ducted Operation Span Task and Letter Monitoring Task to 
measure the role of WM and goal neglect on the relation-
ship between inattentive traits and predictable switching 
performance.
Consistent with previous research (Elisa et al., 2016), 
inattentive traits were unique predictors of the letter moni-
toring and OSPAN scores when controlling for hyperac-
tive/impulsive traits. However, the results from the order 
PC and random PC blocks did not replicate those of Study 
1. A replication of the results from Study 1 would have 
been represented by a relationship between inattention and 
the Order PC condition. This was not observed. Given we 
observed no relationship between inattention and the Order 
PC, Random PC and Random RC blocks and inattention (or 
any of the other ADHD symptoms) our data suggest that 
those high in inattention do not experience difficulties with 
keeping tracking of task order, the use of proactive control 
Table 6  Summary of regression 
model for inattention and 
hyperactivity/impulsivity scores 
on random PC/RC condition in 
Study 2
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Variable b SEb β T R2 Adjusted R2 Semi-
partial cor-
relation
Inattention 75.70 30.03 0.28 2.52* 0.08 0.05 0.24
Hyperactivity/
impulsivity
− 39.98 28.20 − 0.16 − 1.42  − 0.14
Table 7  Summary of regression 
model for inattention and 
hyperactivity/impulsivity scores 
on order PC/RC condition when 
controlling for SPM scores 
(Study 2)
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Variable b SEb β T R2 Adjusted R2 Semi-
partial cor-
relation
SPM 12.25 7.61 0.15 1.61 0.08 0.05 0.15
Inattention 80.41 34.93 0.25 2.30* 0.22
Hyperactivity/
impulsivity
− 11.73 32.85 − 0.04 − 0.36  − 0.04
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or the use of reactive control, respectively. The Order PC/
RC and Random PC/RC conditions, which were related to 
inattention, differed from all other conditions by including 
the possibility of employing both types of control on each 
trial. Our findings showing that the impairments in switching 
were mediated by the tendency for goal neglect permit us 
to conclude that it is likely that inattentive participants were 
neglecting proactive control and relying on reactive control 
to complete the task.
The relationship between inattentive traits and switch 
costs in random PC/RC and order PC/RC is consistent with 
the literature reporting that individuals with low WM capac-
ity use proactive control less compared to those with high 
WM capacity (Engle and Kane, 2003; Redick et al., 2011; 
Unsworth et al., 2004). Given the negative relationship 
between inattentive traits and measures of WM in the cur-
rent study (OSPAN scores) and in the literature (e.g. Gath-
ercole et al., 2008; Lui and Tannock, 2007), it is reasonable 
to expect the decreased use of proactive control as the scores 
of inattentive traits increase. However, it is important to note 
that OSPAN scores were not correlated to the switch costs 
in any of the blocks. Thus, the present findings stress the 
role of goal neglect in the failure to appropriately weight 
all aspects of task instructions in the task model, rather 
than the OSPAN performance, involving maintenance plus 
manipulation of information on the trial in task switching 
performance.
Consistent with Verbruggen et al. (2007) who reported 
successfully eliminated switch costs when use of the 
advanced cue was strongly encouraged, the presence of an 
advanced cue or trackable order in the absence of any other 
cue appears to have encouraged those high in inattention to 
prepare in advance. In the random PC and order PC condi-
tions, the screen only contained a black frame and a digit 
which could indicate either of the tasks. Therefore, the only 
way to know the next task was to keep track of the task order 
(in order PC) or focusing on the advanced cue (in random 
PC). Therefore, the goal of attending the cue was reinforced 
in these conditions.
Fig. 7  The mediation effect of 
Letter monitoring performance 
on the link between inattention 
scores and switching perfor-
mance of random (a) and order 
(b) PC/RC (Study 2). Bootstrap-
ping was used to calculate a 
95% confidence interval around 
the indirect effect using 1000 
resamples
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It is unclear why the Order PC condition did not replicate 
the high WM condition of Study 1. However, a key differ-
ence between the two conditions was the presence of an 
empty black square 250 ms prior to the onset of the stimulus 
in Study 2. It is possible that this square served as a cue to 
withdraw the previous event from memory and remind them 
of the need to prepare in time for the upcoming trial; we 
consider this especially likely given that in other conditions 
the square could be informative. That is, the pseudo-cue in 
Study 2 acts as a nudge to prevent goal neglect. There is 
some precedence for this in the goal neglect literature. Dun-
can et al. (1996) noted that verbal prompts were enough to 
prevent the occurrence of goal neglect in the letter-moni-
toring task. Likewise, Parris et al. (2012) also used goal-
related primes to prompt the goal of responding quickly and 
accurately during Stroop performance which resulted in the 
elimination of Stroop interference. These studies suggest 
that it is possible that a stimulus that has previously acted 
as a cue to prepare for an upcoming trial might serve as a 
reminder of the need to prepare, even if that cue was not 
being utilised efficiently when it was informative.
General discussion
In two studies, we conducted predictable and unpredict-
able task switching paradigms (TSPs) to investigate the link 
between inattentive traits and task switching performance. 
Study one revealed that inattentive traits uniquely predicted 
higher switch costs when there was a set task order that 
needed to be tracked to permit preparatory control. Study 
2 revealed that it was not the ability to perform preparatory 
processes per se that led to the association between switch 
costs and inattention, but instead, it was the tendency for 
those high in inattention to neglect preparatory processes, 
especially when reactive control options were available. 
Importantly, the task switching impairment in those high 
in inattention was related to performance on a goal neglect 
task. This indicates that the lack of preparatory control was 
related to a newly reported capacity limit reported by Dun-
can et al. (1996, 2008) that they have linked to the episodic 
buffer component of working memory. Another way to 
understand the present results are as a failure to engage in 
preparatory control despite the capacity to do so (De Jong, 
Berendsen, & Cools, 1999). The finding that task switch-
ing performance is linked to the tendency for goal neglect 
in only inattentive participants is consistent with previous 
work showing that goal neglect is unique to inattention 
(Elisa et al., 2016).
Consistent with the mixed findings on the relationship 
between ADHD and task switching performance reviewed 
in the introduction, our composite scores of ADHD ten-
dencies (CAARS-S:S -index in study one and ASRS-total 
in study two) were not related to switch costs. It is inter-
esting that inattentive tendencies alone were related to 
predictable switch costs whilst composite tendencies of 
ADHD were not. Such a finding highlights the importance 
of considering the role of individual symptoms when 
investigating ADHD, at least at subclinical levels. Indeed, 
the idea of measuring ADHD as a continuum has been pro-
posed. The idea is that a clinical diagnosis represents the 
extreme end of the inattention, hyperactivity and impulsiv-
ity continuums (Barkley and Murphy, 1998). Our findings 
are consistent with previous studies measuring sub-clinical 
ADHD traits on a continuous scale (Seli et al., 2015; Elisa 
et al., 2016; Overbey et al., 2011; Lui and Tannock, 2007) 
and as with those studies, have implications for clinical 
level inattention.
Consistent with other studies in the literature (Gath-
ercole et al., 2008; Lui and Tannock, 2007) our results 
showed that OSPAN scores do not correlate with switch 
costs (see also Kane et al., 2007; Logan, 2004 for no rela-
tionship between WM measures and task switching per-
formance) and is thus supportive of the notion that work-
ing memory is independent of task switching capacity 
(Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 
2000). However, it has been argued that goal neglect is 
related to an impairment in the episodic buffer of Badde-
ley’s (2000) working memory model (Duncan et al., 2008) 
indicating that there might be aspects of working memory 
that are related to task switching performance.
In summary, in two studies, we measured the link between 
task switching performance and self-reported ADHD traits. 
In both studies we report increased switch costs in those 
high in self-reported inattention. We have concluded that 
the increased switch costs are due to the frequent failure 
to engage in preparatory proactive control, especially when 
the ability to use reactive control is available. The media-
tion of the impairment in the use of proactive control by 
goal neglect indicates that the proactive component of the 
instructions was under-weighted as part of the task goal.
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